An Assessment of Derivative RICO Actions by Stockholders, Limited Partners and Trust Beneficiaries by Bamonte, Thomas J.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 21
Issue 1 Fall 1989 Article 6
1989
An Assessment of Derivative RICO Actions by
Stockholders, Limited Partners and Trust
Beneficiaries
Thomas J. Bamonte
Partner, Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd. Chicago, IL
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thomas J. Bamonte, An Assessment of Derivative RICO Actions by Stockholders, Limited Partners and Trust Beneficiaries, 21 Loy. U. Chi. L.
J. 153 (1989).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol21/iss1/6
An Assessment Of Derivative RICO Actions by
Stockholders, Limited Partners and Trust
Beneficiaries
Thomas J. Bamonte *
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 1964(c) of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act ("RICO") provides a private cause of action to "[a]ny
person injured in his business or property" from a pattern of racke-
teering activity.1 In an effort to limit the broad scope of RICO,
courts have imposed standing requirements designed to limit
RICO plaintiffs to those parties directly injured by a pattern of
racketeering activity.2 Most notably, courts have concluded that
section 1964(c) does not relax common law standing
requirements.
At common law a stockholder does not have standing as an indi-
vidual to sue for an injury inflicted upon the corporation, even if
the value of the stockholder's shares falls as a result of the injury.4
Consequently, courts repeatedly have dismissed RICO actions
brought by stockholders for lack of standing on the ground that
the stockholders have been only indirectly injured by a pattern of
racketeering activity directed at the corporation.' The common
law, however, provides a mechanism by which stockholders can
bring suit in a representative capacity to vindicate the rights of a
corporation that has been a victim of wrongdoing. Such derivative
actions by stockholders have been a fixture of the law of corpora-
tions for over a century. No court has yet considered in-depth
whether RICO standing principles bar stockholder derivative
RICO actions. There is a risk that in their aggressive use of stand-
ing requirements to limit the scope of RICO, courts will overlook
the derivative action mechanism and hold that only the corpora-
* B.A. Univ. of Chicago, J.D. Northwestern Univ. Mr. Bamonte is a partner at the
Chicago law firm of Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd.
1. The Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452,
§ 901(a), 84 Stat. 947 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988)).
2. See infra notes 7-22 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
5. Id.
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tion victimized by a pattern of racketeering activity has standing to
bring a RICO action against the wrongdoer. 6
This Article examines whether RICO standing doctrines can be
squared with stockholder derivative RICO actions. After survey-
ing the judicial response to RICO suits by stockholders and after
describing the derivative action mechanism, this Article suggests
that courts should permit stockholder derivative RICO actions. It
also examines the analogous rights of limited partners and trust
beneficiaries to bring derivative RICO actions and concludes that
these groups, like stockholders, should be able to maintain such
actions.
II. THESTANDING LIMITS ON RICO ACTIONS BY
STOCKHOLDERS
In their effort to restrict the broad scope of RICO, many courts
have imposed standing requirements designed to limit the right to
pursue a RICO action to only those parties "directly injured" by a
RICO violation.7 Other courts have rejected a strict direct/indi-
rect injury dichotomy as the test of RICO standing but have im-
posed standing requirements nearly as restrictive.8 Thus, courts
have held that union members have no standing to bring RICO
6. The court in Nordberg v. Lord, Day & Lord, 107 F.R.D. 692, 699 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), for example, stated that "only the corporation may bring a RICO action to redress
injury suffered by the corporation." See Carter v. Berger, 777 F.2d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir.
1985) ("only the firm may vindicate the [RICO] rights at issue"); Small v. Goldman, 637
F. Supp. 1030, 1031 (D.N.J. 1986); Club Assistance Program, Inc. v. Zukerman, 594 F.
Supp. 341, 348 n.15 (N.D. Ill. 1984) ("any RICO cause of action for diminution in value
of the corporation, belongs to the corporation"). Taken literally, such admonitions
would rule out shareholder derivative RICO actions. See also infra notes 7, 46, 56 and
accompanying text (further discussion of Carter case).
7. The United States Supreme Court in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479
(1985) laid the foundation of the standing doctrine in RICO actions. The Sedima Court
held that recoverable RICO damages are those which "flow from the commission or pred-
icate acts." Id. at 497 (emphasis added). Lower courts have interpreted Sedima as re-
quiring a "direct injury." See Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co. v. Pate, 819 F.2d 806, 809 (7th
Cir. 1987); Morast v. Lance, 807 F.2d 926, 932-33 (1 1th Cir. 1987); Nodine v. Textron,
Inc., 819 F.2d 347, 348-49 (1st Cir. 1987); see also Town of Kearney v. Hudson Meadows
Urban Renewal Corp., 829 F.2d 1263, 1268 (3d Cir. 1987); Klapper v. Commonwealth
Realty Trust, 657 F. Supp. 948, 953 (D. Del. 1987) ("the requirement of direct injury is
the gravamen of RICO standing"). In Carter, 777 F.2d at 1176, the court stated "that
the directly injured party should receive a complete recovery, no matter what; an indi-
rectly injured party should look to the recovery of the directly injured party, not. to the
wrongdoer, for relief."
8. See, e.g., Zervas v. Faulkner, 861 F.2d 823, 832-35 (5th Cir. 1988) (rejecting di-
rect/indirect dichotomy in favor of "proximate cause" approach); see also Branderburg v.
Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1187 (4th Cir. 1988); Sperber v. Boesky, 849 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir.
1988).
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actions to redress a pattern of racketeering inflicted upon their
union.9 Guarantors have no standing to bring a RICO suit against
a pattern of racketeering aimed at their obligors. 10 Creditors lack
standing to complain of RICO violations committed against the
debtor. " Employees have no standing to bring RICO actions com-
plaining that they were fired for "whistle-blowing" or for refusing
to participate in a pattern of racketeering. 12 Governmental bodies
do not have standing to bring RICO claims in a parens patriae
capacity. 13
As part of this effort to limit RICO standing, courts consistently
have barred stockholders from bringing RICO actions in their indi-
vidual capacity for injuries inflicted upon a corporation through a
pattern of racketeering activity. In an important early case, War-
ren v. Manufacturers National Bank, " for example, the stock-
holder of a corporation bankrupted allegedly by a creditor's
interest rate overcharges brought a RICO action in his capacity as
a stockholder. Looking to general principles of corporate law, the
court found that only the corporation had a right of action against
9. See Adams-Lundy v. Association of Professional Flight Attendants, 844 F.2d 245,
258 (5th Cir. 1988); Bass v. Campagnone, 838 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1988).
10. See Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 877 F.2d 1333, 1336 (7th
Cir. 1989); Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); Continen-
tal Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Windham, 668 F. Supp. 578, 586 (E.D. Tex. 1987);
Grant v. Union Bank, 629 F. Supp. 570, 573 (D. Utah 1986).
11. See National Enter., Inc. v. Mellon Fin. Servs. Corp., 847 F.2d 251, 254-55 (5th
Cir. 1988) ("To be sure, today we will not say that the creditor . . . can never have
standing under RICO .... We suppose that such standing is imaginable" but in the usual
case the creditor lacks standing) (emphasis in original); Barnett v. Stem, 93 Bankr. 962,
967 (N.D. Ill. 1988). But see Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096, 1100-01 (2d
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1642 (1989) (creditor had RICO standing because
direct victim of bankruptcy fraud).
12. See Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir. 1989); Norman
v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 873 F.2d 634, 637 (2d Cir. 1989); Cullom v. Hibernia
Nat'l Bank, 859 F.2d 1211, 1215 (5th Cir. 1988); Morast v. Lance, 807 F.2d 926, 932-33
(11th Cir. 1987); Nodine v. Textron, Inc., 819 F.2d 347, 349 (1st Cir. 1987); Pujol v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 829 F.2d 1201, 1205 (1st Cir. 1987).
13. See State of Illinois v. Life of Mid-America Ins. Co., 805 F.2d 763, 766 (7th Cir.
1986). Courts have been unsuccessful in other attempts to limit the scope of RICO
through restrictive standing requirements. For example, in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495-97 (1985), the Supreme Court rejected the Second Circuit's at-
tempt to impose a "racketeering injury" standing requirement. The Court also recently
rejected a requirement that the predicate acts for a RICO action must be characteristic of
organized crime. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989). Other
attempts to limit RICO likewise have been rejected. See Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United
Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1287 (7th Cir. 1983) (rejecting "competitive injury"
standing requirement); USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 94 n. 1
(6th Cir. 1982) (rejecting prior RICO conviction requirement).
14. 759 F.2d 542, 543 (6th Cir. 1985).
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the creditor and dismissed the RICO claim.' 5
The court in Warren concluded that nothing in the language of
the RICO statute indicates that Congress intended to relax the
common law rule barring stockholders from suing in their individ-
ual capacity for injuries inflicted upon the corporation:
Whether RICO should or should not be interpreted to 'federal-
ize' common law fraud is an issue distinct from whether it should
be interpreted to materially expand the standing requirement ap-
plicable to such claims. Allowing every shareholder, employee
and creditor a cause of action for injuries derivative of those suf-
fered directly by a corporation does not just permit a vast
amount of litigation to be brought in federal court that previously
could only have been brought in state court, but creates a poten-
tial avalanche of suits that previously could not have been
brought at all.' 6
Like Warren, other courts have refused to allow stockholders to
individually proceed with RICO suits to redress injuries from a
pattern of racketeering activity directed against the corporation. 7
The stockholder RICO actions filed after the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") has taken over a failed financial
institution are typical. 8 Stockholders in such cases file individual
actions against the directors of the failed financial institution for
two reasons. Shareholders file such actions in an effort to get a
larger recovery than they would receive as a result of the FDIC's
liquidation or reorganization of the financial institution and in or-
der to avoid the burdensome procedural requirements associated
with stockholder derivative actions. '9 The courts generally look to
state law to determine if the stockholder's claimed injury is unique,
i.e., direct to the stockholder and thus of the type for which the
15. Id. at 544.
16. Id. at 545 (emphasis in original); see also Gallagher v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 588 F.
Supp. 108, 110 (N.D. I11. 1984) ("there is no indication whatever Congress intended
courts to disregard the corporate entity in interpreting Section 1964(c)").
17. See Flynn v. Merrick, 881 F.2d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 1989); Sparling v. Hoffman
Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1988); Crocker v. FDIC, 826 F.2d 347, 352
(5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1075 (1988); Gaffv. FDIC, 814 F.2d 311, 315 (6th
Cir. 1987); Roeder v. Alpha Indus. Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 29-30 (1st Cir. 1987); Warner v.
Alexander Grant & Co., 828 F.2d 1528, 1530-31 (11th Cir. 1987); Rand v. Anaconda-
Ericsson, Inc., 794 F.2d 843, 849 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986). The result
does not change even if the plaintiff is the sole stockholder of the corporation. See Spar-
ling, 864 F.2d at 640-41.
18. See Leach v. FDIC, 860 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186
(1989); Crocker v. F.D.I.C., 826 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1987); Stevens v. Lowder, 643 F.2d
1078 (5th Cir. 1981).
19. See infra notes 35-44 and accompanying text (for a discussion of the procedural
requirements of derivative actions).
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stockholder can sue in an individual capacity.20 The courts use the
same state law standards to determine stockholder standing in
RICO actions as they use to evaluate the standing of stockholders
who bring other types of federal and state law claims.2'
The FDIC's litigation capabilities, and its incentive as the re-
ceiver of a failed financial institution to vigorously pursue RICO
claims belonging to the institution, may have lulled some courts
into making pronouncements that only a corporation has standing
to bring a RICO claim for injuries suffered from a pattern of racke-
teering directed at the corporation. 22 To date, however, the deci-
sions in stockholder RICO actions have failed to address whether
stockholders may bring derivative RICO actions when the corpo-
ration is unable or unreasonably fails to pursue RICO claims that
belong to the corporation.
III. STOCKHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
Stockholder derivative actions are a creation of equity and have
been a well recognized feature of American jurisprudence for over
150 years.23 In a derivative action, the corporation is the real party
in interest. 24 The stockholder bringing the action is only the nomi-
nal plaintiff2 5 because the substantive claims raised in a derivative
action belong to the corporation rather than the stockholder. 26
The derivative action mechanism originated as the principal de-
fense of minority stockholders against abuses of the majority stock-
holders.27 As the base of equity ownership in corporations
20. See Leach, 860 F.2d at 1274; Crocker, 826 F.2d at 349; see also Mid-State Ferti-
lizer Co. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 877 F.2d 1333, 1335 (7th Cir. 1989); Ocean Energy II,
Inc. v. Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 868 F.2d 740, 744-45 (5th Cir. 1989).
21. See Sparling, 864 F.2d at 640-41 (standing to bring fraud claim); Crocker, 826
F.2d at 349-52 (standing to bring misrepresentation claim). See generally FED. R. Civ.
P. 17(b).
22. See Leach, 860 F.2d at 1272; see also Rand v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 794 F.2d
843, 849 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986).
23. See generally Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suits: Notes on Its Derivation,
32 N.Y.U.L. REV. 980 (1957).
24. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811
(Del. 1984).
25. Ross, 396 U.S. at 538.
26. Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522 (1947). The Rand
court stated that "[a] RICO action... is a corporate asset, and shareholders cannot bring
it in their own names without impairing the rights of prior claimants to such assets." 794
F.2d at 849. See also Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 877 F.2d 1333,
1335 (7th Cir. 1989). For further discussion of Mid-State, see infra note 53 and accompa-
nying text.
27. See generally McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 831-33 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961).
1990]
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broadened, resulting in a growing separation of equity ownership
from day-to-day control of the typical corporation, the derivative
action took on an "important role in protecting stockholders of
corporations from the designing schemes and wishes of insiders
who are willing to betray their company's interests in order to en-
rich themselves."28 The derivative action "developed in equity to
enable shareholders to sue in the corporation's name when those in
control of the company refused to assert a claim belonging to it."'29
In order to maintain a derivative action, a stockholder must allege
that the corporation has a cause of action.3" For example, fraud or
breaches of fiduciary duty perpetrated against the corporation by
insiders, the wrongful acts of third parties against the corporation,
and ultra vires acts by the corporation all can give rise to a stock-
holder derivative action.3' In addition, the stockholder must show
that he will be harmed by, for example, a decline in the value of the
corporation's stock, if the corporation fails to assert its legal
rights.32
In contrast, a stockholder may maintain an individual action
against a corporation when the stockholder has sustained a "spe-
cial injury." The special injury requirement is satisfied when the
alleged wrong has been inflicted upon a stockholder in his individ-
ual capacity, independent of any duty owed the corporation. 33 For
instance, stockholders have standing to sue when the alleged
wrong is directed at the contractual rights of stockholders such as
their right to vote.34
28. Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 371 (1966); see also Pogostin v.
Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984).
29. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984). See generally R. CLARK, COR-
PORATE LAW 636-40 (1986).
30. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 307-08 (1936); see Sparling
v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1988); Crocker v. FDIC, 826
F.2d 347, 350-52 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Crossland v. Canteen Corp., 711 F.2d 714, 720
n.3 (5th Cir. 1983); Miller v. AT & T Corp., 507 F.2d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1974). See
generally FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b).
31. See Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 237-38 (5th Cir. 1983) (breach of duty);
Papilsky v. Berndt, 466 F.2d 251 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1077 (1972) (ultra vires
acts). See generally W. M. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPO-
RATIONS §§ 5945-5956 (perm. ed. 1984).
32. Brown v. Ferro Corp., 763 F.2d 798, 801-03 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 947
(1985); Citron v. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp., 409 A.2d 607, 610-11 (Del. Ch. 1977).
33. Moran v. Household Int'l, 490 A.2d 1059, 1070 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500 A.2d 1346
(Del. 1985); see Kush v. American States Ins. Co., 853 F.2d 1380, 1383 (7th Cir. 1988)
(Illinois law); Lipton v. News Int'l Plc., 514 A.2d 1075, 1098-99 (Del. 1986); see also
Rabkin v. Hunt Chem. Corp., C.A. No. 7547 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 1986) (challenged action
unfair to minority stockholders).
34. See Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971); Moran,
490 A.2d at 1070-71; Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769, 775 (Del. Ch.
[Vol. 21
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Parties who bring derivative actions must meet several proce-
dural requirements designed to protect the corporation against
abuse of the derivative action mechanism. Most notably, before
pursuing a derivative action, the stockholder must make a demand
upon the corporation to rectify the alleged wrong." The demand
requirement allows the directors of the-corporation the opportu-
nity to take corrective action without the cost and delay of litiga-
tion.36 The demand requirement also protects the corporation
against strike suits. 37 In exercising their business judgment after
demand has been made, the directors may dismiss the derivative
action as unfounded or otherwise not in the best interests of the
corporation. 8 Generally, courts have taken a deferential posture
toward decisions to dismiss derivative actions purportedly made by
independent special committees of boards of directors.39
The courts, however, do waive the demand requirement in in-
stances demand would be futile when, for example, an obvious con-
flict of interest of the corporation's board of directors exists, or the
corporation is under the control of the persons who have commit-
ted or threaten to commit the complained of wrongs.' Derivative
actions may also go forward when corporate insiders wrongfully
fail to take action on behalf of the corporation after demand has
been made.4"
1967); Elster v. American Airlines, 100 A.2d 219, 222 (Del. Ch. 1953). Courts may
disregard the special injury requirement in "exceptional situations where it otherwise
would present an obstacle to the due protection or enforcement of public or private
rights." Bevelheimer v. Gierach, 33 Ill. App. 3d 988, 992-3, 339 N.E.2d 299, 303 (1st
Dist. 1973).
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 7.80 (1987). See, e.g., Smith
v. Sparling, 354 U.S. 91, 94 (1957); Starrels v. First Nat'l Bank, 870 F.2d 1168, 1169 (7th
Cir. 1989); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808-09 (Del. 1984).
36. Kaplan v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 540 A.2d 726, 730 (Del. 1988); see
Elfenbein v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 590 F.2d 445, 450-51 (2d Cir. 1978).
37. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811-12.
38. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981); Schick Inc. v. Amal-
gamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, 533 A.2d 235, 240-41 (Del. Ch. 1987). See
infra note 41 and accompanying text (Zapata analysis of directors' motion to dismiss).
39. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 483-86 (1979); Abramowitz v. Posner, 672
F.2d 1025, 1034 (3d Cir. 1982); Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 59-61 (2d Cir. 1980);
Rosengarten v. Buckley, 613 F. Supp. 1493, 1499-1501 (D. Md. 1985).
40. Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522 (1947); Aronson,
473 A.2d at 814; see also Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, 744 F.2d 255, 261-62 (2d Cir. 1984)
(board participated in "wrongful transactions"); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627
(Del. 1984) (demand is excused when "allegations detail the manipulation of corporate
machinery by directors for sole or primary purpose of perpetuating themselves in office").
41. See Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788-89. Zapata establishes a two-step analysis to be
applied to a motion to dismiss a derivative action: (1) whether the board or special com-
mittee made a reasonable investigation, and acted independently and in good faith; (2) if
Loyola University Law Journal
Stockholders bringing a derivative action must surmount other
procedural obstacles in addition to meeting the demand require-
ment. Stockholder derivative plaintiffs must establish that they
were stockholders at the time of the alleged wrong, and they must
maintain stockholder status throughout the litigation. 42 In addi-
tion, the stockholder bringing the derivative action must be a fair
and adequate representative of the stockholders who are enforcing
the corporation's right.43 Finally, settlements and dismissals of
derivative actions require court approval after notice to the
stockholders."4
IV. AN ASSESSMENT OF STOCKHOLDER DERIVATIVE
RICO ACTIONS
The reported decisions discussing stockholder standing to bring
RICO actions have arisen when the stockholder is suing in an indi-
vidual capacity. 45 These cases have turned on whether the stock-
holder has demonstrated a "special injury" under the applicable
state law such that the stockholder has standing to bring an action
in an individual capacity. The sweeping language in some of these
opinions imply that only the injured corporation has standing to
bring a RICO action.46 The standing doctrines applied in those
cases, however, do not foreclose stockholder derivative RICO ac-
tions if a derivative action is appropriate under applicable rules
governing derivative actions.
No court, in fact, has directly faced whether section 1964(c) im-
poses stricter standing requirements for stockholder derivative
RICO actions than common law derivative action rules, or
the coporation satisfies this first burden, the court may exercise its own business judgment
to determine if the derivative suit should be dismissed. Compare Kaplan v. Wyatt, 499
A.2d 1184, 1191-92 (Del. 1985) (approving recommendation by special committee of di-
rectors that derivative action be dismissed) with Lewis v. Fugua, 502 A.2d 962, 967 (Del.
Ch. 1989) (denying motion to dismiss derivative action under two-step Zapata analysis);
see also Joy v, North, 692 F.2d 880, 888 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983)
(derivative action should not have been dismissed because special committee members
were not independent); Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 1275, 1284 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
42. See Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostock R.R.C., 417 U.S. 703,
707-08 nn.3 & 4 (1974); Schreiber v. Bryan, 396 A.2d 512, 516 (Del. Ch. 1978).
43. Youngman v. Tahmoush, 457 A.2d 376, 379 (Del. Ch. 1983); see also Kauffman
v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 735 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974
(1971).
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1. See generally In re Ortiz Estate, 27
A.2d 368, 374 (Del. Ch. 1942).
45. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Carter v. Berger, 777 F.2d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir. 1985) ("only the firm
may vindicate the [RICO] rights at issue").
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whether section 1964(c) altogether bars stockholder derivative ac-
tions on the ground that only the directly injured party can be a
RICO plaintiff. There are several reasons why the courts should
neither bar stockholder derivative RICO actions nor impose more
burdensome standing requirements on such actions than those al-
ready imposed by the common law.
First, the RICO statute's language does not reveal any Congres-
sional intent to displace common law standing rules and to bar
stockholder derivative RICO actions. Section 1964(c) gives "any
person injured in his business or property" standing to bring a
RICO action.47 In fact, the language of section 1964(c) can be read
broadly as relaxing the common law bar against individual stock-
holder actions directed at the party which inflicted an injury on the
corporation. Section 1964(c), after all, appears to give the stock-
holder ("any person") whose stock ("property") has declined in
value due to a pattern of racketeering activity perpetrated against
the corporation, standing to bring a RICO action against the
wrongdoer. To similar effect is the statutory directive that RICO
be liberally construed.48
Second, when considering an individual stockholder's RICO
suit, courts have pointed to Congressional silence in the RICO
statute as evidence of Congressional intent to not relax common
law standing requirements for such actions.49 The same logic can
be applied to determine whether Congress intended to preclude or
restrict derivative RICO actions. Presumably, when enacting the
RICO statute, Congress knew of the shareholder derivative ac-
tion's function and operation. Therefore, Congress' silence with
regard to shareholder derivative RICO actions evidences its intent
to neither preclude nor restrict shareholder derivative actions.
Third, courts long have recognized that stockholders can bring
derivative actions raising federal as well as state law claims. Stock-
holders, for example, may pursue securities law claims in a deriva-
tive capacity.5" Most notably, courts allow stockholder derivative
actions raising federal antitrust law claims.5' Congress looked to
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
48. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452,
§ 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1661-68 (1988)).
49. See Warren v. Manufacturing Nat'l Bank, 759 F.2d 542, 545-46 (6th Cir. 1985);
see also Gallagher v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 588 F. Supp 108, 110 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
50. See Fields v. Fidelity Gen. Ins. Co., 454 F.2d 682, 684 (7th Cir. 1982); Drachman
v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, 726 (2d Cir. 1972); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d
221, 228-29 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819,
829 (5th Cir. 1970).
51. See Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 734 (3d Cir. 1970), cert.
1990]
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the antitrust laws as a model in drafting the RICO statute52 and
presumably was aware that the courts likely would allow stock-
holder derivative RICO actions unless directed otherwise." The
absence of an express bar to stockholder derivative RICO actions
indicates Congressional acceptance of such actions.
Fourth, as noted above, one of the derivative action's key func-
tions has been to allow stockholders to vindicate the corporation's
rights when the corporation is unable or unreasonably fails to as-
sert its rights against an exploitative insider or a third-party wrong-
doer.54 Allowing stockholders to pursue RICO actions on behalf
of their corporation in such situations comports with the common
law and statutory framework of the derivative action. Stockholder
derivative RICO actions require no modification or abrogation of
state law rules governing the circumstances in which stockholders
can bring actions in their individual capacity. Nor must existing
procedural requirements associated with stockholder derivative ac-
tions be changed to accommodate stockholder derivative RICO ac-
tions. In fact, courts on occasion have applied, with no evident
difficulty, rules governing derivative actions to shareholder deriva-
tive RICO actions.55
Fifth, RICO claims belonging to a corporation are likely to arise
in the very situations that disable the corporation from protecting
its legal rights. This is true, for example, when the perpetrator of a
pattern of racketeering activity against the corporation controls the
denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971); Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 414 F.2d 956 (2d Cir.
1969); Rogers v. American Can Co., 305 F.2d 297, 317 (3d Cir. 1962); Ramsburg v.
American Inv. Co., 231 F.2d 333, 339 (7th Cir. 1956); Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Para-
mount Pictures, Inc., 202 F.2d 731, 734-35 (2d Cir. 1953); see also Stein v. United Artists
Corp., 691 F.2d 885, 897 (9th Cir. 1982).
52. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 489 (1985).
53. See Mid-State Fertilizer v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 877 F.2d 1333, 1335 (7th Cir.
1989) ("the rules established in anti-trust cases for identifying the proper plaintiffs should
be applied to RICO...").
54. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Starrels v. First Nat'l Bank, 870 F.2d 1168, 1170 (7th Cir. 1989) (dis-
missing RICO action because stockholder had not met demand requirement); Shields v.
Erickson, 710 F. Supp. 686, 689 (N.D. 11. 1989) (dismissing stockholder derivative
RICO action for failure to meet demand requirement); Wilson v. Askew, 709 F. Supp.
146, 153 (W.D. Ark. 1989) (finding "unique injury" allowing individual action but dis-
missing RICO claim on merits); Lochhead v. Alacano, 697 F. Supp. 406, 413 (D. Utah
1988) (allowing stockholders alleging unfair dilution of their ownership position to bring
RICO claim in individual capacity); Allison ex rel. GM v. GM, 604 F. Supp. 1106, 1120
(D. Del. 1985) (approving director termination of stockholder derivative RICO action
but reserving question of availability of such actions); c.f, In re Phillips Petroleum Sec.
Litig., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,538 (3d Cir. Aug. 9, 1989)
(RICO class claim).
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corporation.56 RICO's well recognized core purpose is to prevent
"racketeers" from gaining control of legitimate companies through
a pattern of racketeering activity. 57 When coupled with the ex-
isting barriers to RICO actions by creditors, guarantors, employees
and others with a stake in the corporation, the practical effect of a
prohibition on stockholder derivative RICO actions would be to
insulate from civil RICO actions those parties who perpetrated a
pattern of racketeering against a company over which they had
control. Ironic indeed would be a rule that leaves the decision of
whether a company will bring a RICO action to the very parties
who may have perpetrated a pattern of racketeering activity
against the corporation.
Finally, the procedural requirements that stockholders must
meet before bringing a derivative action alleviate the purported
threat of an "avalanche" of stockholder RICO suits so feared by
the courts.5" There is no evidence that the demand requirement
and the other procedural rules associated with derivative actions
will be less effective with respect to RICO claims than with other
types of claims.59
V. DERIVATIVE ACTIONS BY LIMITED PARTNERS
The law is less well developed with respect to derivative actions
brought by limited partners on behalf of a partnership. The exist-
ence and scope of the limited partner's right to bring a derivative
action is determined by applicable state law.6° Courts are split as
to whether limited partners have the capacity to bring a derivative
56. See, e.g., Rubin v. Posner, 701 F. Supp. 1041, 1044 (D. Del. 1988) (corporation
president engaged in racketeering against corporation in order to benefit another entity he
controlled); see also Lochhead v. Alacano, 697 F. Supp. 406, 408-09 (D. Utah 1988)
(directors fraudulently adopted and executed a stock option plan that resulted in their
receiving additional stock at the time of a merger). In Carter v. Berger, 777 F.2d 1173,
1178 (7th Cir. 1985), a case often cited as support for a bar of RICO suits by parties
indirectly injured by a pattern of racketeering activity, the court nevertheless recognized
that "[d]oubtless indirectly injured parties could recover under RICO when they show
that the directly injured party was under the continuing control or influence of the de-
fendant or his henchmen."
57. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981); Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman &
Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 457 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
58. See Warren v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 759 F.2d 542, 545 (6th Cir. 1985).
59. See Shields ex rel. Sundstrand Corp. v. Erickson, 710 F. Supp. 686, 690-91 (N.D.
Ill. 1989); Allison ex rel. GM v. GM, 604 F. Supp. 1106, 1119-20 (D. Del. 1985); see
supra note 55 and accompanying text.
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b). See also Allright Missouri, Inc. v. Billeter, 829 F.2d 631,
635 (8th Cir. 1987). For further discussion of Alright, see infra notes 71-73 and accom-
panying text.
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suit.61
Courts allowing limited partners to bring derivative actions do
so for three major reasons. First, they analogize limited partners
to stockholders and view limited partners as having a similar need
to protect the investment vehicle when the designated managers
wrongfully do not.62 Second, the two traditional remedies for a
limited partner, namely, dissolution of the partnership and an ac-
tion for accounting, are often ineffective.63 Dissolution may force
the limited partner to terminate a profitable investment or suffer
adverse tax consequences.64 An action for accounting is often inef-
fective when there is ongoing wrongdoing by management or the
wrongs are committed by a third party.65 Third, courts upholding
derivative actions by limited partners have recognized that disrup-
tion to the partnership from such suits will be minimized by requir-
ing the plaintiffs to meet the same procedural requirements as
stockholder derivative plaintiffs.66
In contrast, the rationale for denying derivative suits by limited
partners is based on the premise that restricted management rights
are the quid pro quo for the economic advantages of limited liabil-
ity enjoyed by limited partners. Allowing limited partners to bring
derivative actions, the argument goes, grants them more manage-
ment rights without a corresponding increase in liability. 67 Thus,
derivative actions by limited partners should not be allowed unless
expressly authorized by statute.68
61. Compare cases allowing a limited partner to bring derivative suit: Allright, 829
F.2d at 635; Cates v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 756 F.2d 1161, 1176 (5th Cir.
1985); Mayer v. Oil Field&Sys. Corp., 721 F.2d 59, 67 (2d Cir. 1983); Klebanow v. New
York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 297 (2d Cir. 1965); Engl v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146,
1152-53 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Smith v. Bader, 458 F. Supp. 1184, 1186 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
Serpa v. Jolly King Restaurants, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 626, 632 (S.D. Cal. 1974) with cases
barring a limited partner from bringing a derivative suit: Browing v. Maurice B. Levien &
Co., 262 S.E. 2d 355, 357, appeal denied, 267 S.E.2d 673 (N.C. 1980); Fox v. Sackman,
591 P.2d 855, 857 (Wash. App. 1979); Amsler v. American Home Assurance Co., 348
So.2d 68, 71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 358 So.2d 128 (Fla. 1978); Hauer v.
Bankers Trust N.Y. Corp., 65 F.R.D. 1, 3 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
62. See Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 297 (2d Cir. 1965).
63. Id. at 299.
64. See Allright, 829 F.2d at 636.
65. Id. See generally Hecker, Limited Partners' Derivative Suits under the Revised
Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 33 VAND. L. REV. 343 (1980); Note, Standing of Lim-
ited Partners to Sue Derivatively, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1463 (1965); Note, Procedures and
Remedies in Limited Partners' Suits for Breach of General Partners' Fiduciary Duty, 90
HARV. L. REV. 763 (1977).
66. Allright, 829 F.2d at 639.
67. See Millard v. Newmark & Co., 24 A.D.2d 333, 337, 266 N.Y.S.2d 254, 259
(N.Y. App. Div. 1966).
68. See Hauer v. Bankers Trust N.Y. Corp., 65 F.R.D. 1, 3-4 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
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The weight of authority, however, favors derivative actions by
limited partners. The Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act
provides for derivative actions by limited partners "if general part-
ners with authority to do so have refused to bring the action or if
an effort to cause the general partners to bring the action is not
likely to succeed."' 69 Most states have incorporated into their lim-
ited partnership statutes provisions allowing derivative actions by
limited partners.7"
In the leading case that allows a limited partner to bring a deriv-
ative RICO action, Allright Missouri, Inc. v. Billeter,7' the limited
partner sued the general partners and other parties in connection
with alleged fraud in the conveyance of partnership property to
another partnership controlled by the general partners.7 2 The
Eighth Circuit's opinion thoroughly and persuasively analyzed the
reasons limited partners should be allowed to bring derivative ac-
tions. Its analysis, however, did not focus on whether the rules
governing derivative actions by limited partners should differ when
a RICO claim is involved. This was not an error in the court's
analysis, rather, it reflects the absence of any reason why RICO
claims should be treated differently with respect to the availability
of a derivative action.73 If anything, derivative RICO actions by
limited partners should be favored because the same pattern of
racketeering activity that forms a RICO claim's basis causes the
parties controlling a partnership to fail to vindicate the partner-
ship's rights.74
V. DERIVATIVE ACTION BY TRUST BENEFICIARIES
The law with respect to derivative actions by trust beneficiaries
69. UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 1001 (1976). Under the REVISED UNI-
FORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 1002 (1985), the plaintiff must be a partner at the
time he brings the derivative action, and he must have (i) been a partner at the time of the
action being complained of or (ii) obtained partnership status by operation of law or
pursuant to the partnership agreement from a person who was a partner at the time of
that transaction. In addition, the derivative plaintiff must set forth with particularity the
effort made to persuade the general partner to take action or the reasons for not making
such an effort. Id. at § 1003. Successful plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable expenses,
including attorney's fees. Id. at § 1004.
70. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 15702 (West Supp. 1988); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 1732 (1983); FLA. STAT. § 620.163-.16 6 (West Supp. 1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 106
1/2, para. 160-1 (1987); N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 115-a (McKinney 1988).
71. 829 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1987).
72. Id. at 633-34.
73. See supra notes 46-59 and accompanying text (for a discussion of stockholder
derivative RICO actions).
74. Cf supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
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is even more unsettled than the law with respect to derivative ac-
tions by limited partners.75 Yet, given the vast amount of stock
and other property held in trust and the large number of trust ben-
eficiaries, resolving the question of trust beneficiaries' standing to
bring derivative RICO actions is extremely important.76
At common law, the general rule is that only the trustee has
standing to bring an action on behalf of the trust because the
trustee has legal title to the trust property." Courts, however, do
allow trust beneficiaries to step in the shoes of the trustee when the
trustee fails to bring an action on behalf of the trust for no good
reason.
78
The ability of trust beneficiaries to bring stockholder derivative
actions is governed by state statute. Some states have adopted de-
rivative action statutes based on section 49 of the Model Business
Corporation Act, which provides that no derivative action "shall
be brought. . . by a shareholder.., unless the plaintiff was a holder
of record of shares ... at the time of the transaction of which he
completes. ' 79 In these states, trust beneficiaries cannot maintain
stockholder derivative actions because the trustees, and not the
trust beneficiaries, hold the stock in trust.8 °
Other state statutes allow parties who have a "beneficial inter-
est" in stock to bring a stockholder derivative action." Courts have
construed these statutes as allowing trust beneficiaries to bring
stockholder derivative actions.8 2 Still other states have modeled
their derivative action statutes after Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, which provides that "the complaint . . . shall
allege... that the plaintiff was a shareholder... at the time of the
transaction of which he complains or that his share ... thereafter
devolved on him by operation of law."'8 3 The courts are divided as
to the ability of individual trust beneficiaries to bring stockholder
75. See generally Note, Trust Beneficiary Standing in Shareholder Derivative Actions,
39 STAN. L. REV. 267 (1986).
76. See, e.g., Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 874 F.2d 912, 912 (2d
Cir. 1989) (RICO claim by participant in ERISA plan).
77. See G.G. BOGERT, TRUST & TRUSTEES § 869 (2d ed. rev. 1982).
78. Id. at 90-94.
79. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 49 (1971) (emphasis added).
80. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-049 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-4-121
(1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 7.80 (1987).
81. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE. § 800 (1977); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 626 (McKin-
ney 1988); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1742 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
82. See, e.g., Pearce v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 1058, 1062, 197 Cal. Rptr.
238, 240-41 (1983); Braman v. Westaway, 60 N.Y.S.2d 190, 196 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945).
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (emphasis added). See, e.g., ALA. R. Civ. P. 23.1; DEL. CH.
R. 23.1; MINN. R. Civ. P. 23.06.
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derivative actions under Rule 23.1.84
The better approach is to treat actions by trust beneficiaries as a
form of double derivative action. Double derivative actions typi-
cally occur when a holding company's stockholder brings a deriva-
tive action on behalf of the holding company which is in fact for
the subsidiary corporation's benefit. The theory behind double de-
rivative actions is that, given the close link between holding com-
panies and subsidiaries, the failure of both the holding company
and the subsidiary to take corrective steps justifies a derivative ac-
tion by the holding company's stockholders.8 5 To bring a deriva-
tive action for wrongs committed against the subsidiary, the
stockholder must show a wrongful failure by the management of
both the holding company and the operating company to take cor-
rective action.8 6
The trust beneficiary is similar to the stockholder in the holding
company. Thus, to maintain a derivative action, a trust beneficiary
should be required to show that a third party is harming the prop-
erty interest held by the trust, the trustee has wrongfully failed to
take corrective measures and is or will be unresponsive to any de-
mand for improvement.8 7 Courts generally have upheld double de-
rivative actions,88 and there is no reason why they should ban
derivative actions by trust beneficiaries who meet similar proce-
dural requirements.
Moreover, there are no reasons unique to RICO that should bar
RICO derivative actions by trust beneficiaries. As with all deriva-
tive actions, a derivative action by a trust beneficiary is for the ben-
efit of the entity, the trust, that is being harmed by the actions of
insiders or third parties. Thus, trust beneficiaries who bring deriv-
84. Compare Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 270 F.2d 365, 375 (2d Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 962 (1960) (trust beneficiary could not bring derivative suit without
joining other beneficiaries) with Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 145 F.2d 293, 295
(5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 844 (1945) (trust beneficiary could bring derivative
suit).
85. See generally Brown v. Tenney, 125 Ill. 2d 348, 356-57, 532 N.E.2d 230, 231-33
(1988).
86. Brown, 125 Ill. 2d at 361-62, 532 N.E.2d at 235.
87. See Note, supra note 75, at 286-88.
88. See Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422, 425 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
737 (1944); United States Lines v. United States Lines Co., 96 F.2d 148, 151 (2d Cir.
1938); Kennedy v. Nicastro, 517 F. Supp. 1157, 1161-62 (N.D. I11. 1981); Gadd v. Pear-
son, 351 F. Supp. 895, 900-01 (M.D. Fla. 1972). But see Gaillard v. Natoma Co., 173
Cal. App. 3d 410, 419, 219 Cal Rptr. 74, 79-80 (1985). See generally Note, Remedies of
Stockholder and Parent Corporation for Injuries to Subsidiaries, 50 HARV. L. REV. 963
(1957).
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ative RICO actions are no more suing for "indirect" injuries than
other RICO derivative plaintiffs.
VI. CONCLUSION
Numerous courts have held that stockholders cannot bring
RICO actions in their individual capacity for injuries to their cor-
poration that have resulted from a pattern of racketeering activity.
These decisions, however, do not foreclose derivative actions by
stockholders that raise RICO claims belonging to the corporation.
Stockholder derivative RICO actions further the purposes of the
RICO statute and will be regulated satisfactorily by the existing
procedural rules associated with derivative actions.
Derivative actions by limited partners and trust beneficiaries are
less common and less well-established than derivative actions by
stockholders. Nevertheless, when limited partners and trust bene-
ficiaries satisfy the procedural requirements for maintaining a de-
rivative action, there is nothing unique about the RICO statute
that should bar those parties from maintaining a derivative RICO
action.
A growing number of cases in which courts have dismissed
RICO actions brought by plaintiffs in their individual capacity at-
test to the need for greater utilization of the derivative action
mechanism. Although the procedural requirements for derivative
actions are rigorous, they are not insurmountable. Plaintiffs in
many cases will benefit by meeting these requirements rather than
losing their RICO claim altogether.
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